'that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement' (emphasis added).
I have challenged this presumption arguing that 'the status of refugees under international law is defined […] by the interaction of the different legal orders that may be applicable to any given refugee in any given circumstances, both of universal and regional scope.' 10 It follows that 'the transfer of responsibility from a State to another State, even admitting that such State be a 'safe third country', raises issues of State responsibility to fulfil all the obligations towards refugees under international refugee and human rights law that have been engaged by its exercise of jurisdiction.' 11 Following from this analysis, Foster argues that far from merely circumscribed to the principle of non-refoulement (enshrined in article 33 of the Refugee Convention), the lawfulness of "safe third country" practice requires States 'to consider rights other than Article 33 of the Refugee Convention alone' 12 and therefore that 'the assumption that nothing other than
Article 33 is relevant is clearly unsustainable as a matter of international law.' 13 In her view, 'once a refugee has acquired rights in the sending state, the sending state must ensure that those 
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14 Therefore, the analysis of the international cooperation of States on refugee matters needs to be grounded on a holistic approach to the rights of refugees under international law, including the right of qualifying individuals to be granted asylum enshrined in international human rights instruments of regional scope. 15 If the premise in the analysis of international cooperation among
States is that individuals have a right to be granted asylum (and not merely the right to seek it), the discussion then shifts from the notion of "effective protection" in another safe country to the way in which States may cooperate to establish a system among themselves that allows one of them effectively to discharge all international obligations (including the granting of asylum) on behalf of all States bound by such system. This paper examines State practice on the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts, examining their origin. The paper considers three selected case-studies by examining the practice of three States: Spain, South Africa, and the US. The three cases have been selected in order to allow for the examination of both the law and practice of States within the broader framework of international regional systems where they take place (the Americas, Africa, and Europe), as well as to identify the current trends that such practice shows. Patterns of transnational movement in all three States are characterised by mixed flows of protection-seekers and other migrants, as well as by the use of the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts as a response both within the domestic determination procedure as well as by means of international cooperation agreements with other States. The US and South Africa both receive large numbers of migrants and of asylum-seekers. In Europe, the study of Spain allows to consider a number of matters: it receives a large number of migrants; due to its geographic 14 
International Agreements on Refugee Protection: Assessing State Practice ' (2015) position it is bound under EU Law to control the external borders of the Union; it applies the "safe third country" concept as a matter of domestic legislation, in the context of a multilateral intra-EU agreement, and it the EU Member State with the largest number of international agreements with countries outside the EU on migration matters (also based on the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts). This paper analyses the legal implications and significance of issues arising and provides a critique of the system and its premises from a 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND PROTECTION ELSEWHERE
The background to the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts is to be found in EXCOM Conclusion 58(XL). 22 This instrument addresses the phenomenon of refugees and asylum seekers 'who move in an irregular manner from countries in which they have already found protection, in order to seek asylum or permanent resettlement elsewhere.'
23
The defining elements of the phenomenon under consideration are the following ones:
1) The movement does not originate in countries of origin, but rather in countries where protection has already been found;
2) The purpose of the movement is to seek asylum or permanent resettlement in another country; and
3) The movement is irregular Consequently, Conclusion 58(XL) allows for the return of individuals to the country where they have already found protection (para f). 24 And it is this return that States have sought to facilitate by the conclusion of international bilateral and multilateral agreements. ' Problem of refugees and asylum-seekers who move in an irregular manner from a country in which they had already found protection ' (1989) . 24 The Conclusion nevertheless recognises that 'there may be exceptional cases in which a refugee or asylum seeker may justifiably claim that he has reason to fear persecution or that his physical safety or freedom are endangered in a country where he previously found protection. Such cases should be given favourable consideration by the authorities of the State where he requests asylum', para (g). In relation to the scope of application of the Conclusion, namely, who is to be considered as having already found protection, Turkey made it clear that the Conclusion did not apply to refugees and asylum seekers who were merely in transit in another country. Italy wanted further clarification that the Conclusion was only applicable to recognised refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, as well as to asylum seekers who have already found protection in the first country of asylum in line with the principles in the said instruments.
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In relation to the criteria allowing the country of final destination to return a refugee or asylum seeker to the country of first asylum, Germany (joined by Austria) stated that the words 'permitted to remain there' in paragraph (f) did not require a formal residence permit. 27 The issue of losing the protection already found, also emerged at this time, as Tanzania stated that it construed its responsibility to protect a refugee as ceasing from the moment he voluntarily leaves the country, and accordingly accepted no obligation to readmit such refugee. 28 These debates show that the "safe third country" and "first country of asylum" concepts were key from the beginning in the attempts to articulate the phenomenon of international cooperation to address secondary movements of refugees. More recently, debates hosted by UNHCR have highlighted that defining secondary movements, and with it, the assessment of States' cooperation in relation to them, remain controversial. Asylum seekers have the right to work and to access basic social services during the time of the procedure. But in practice, high levels of unemployment and widespread xenophobia mean that asylum seekers often have difficulty in accessing the job market and effectively benefitting from public services. 35 South Africa's protection system is articulated in the 1998 Refugees Act. 36 The "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts are not incorporated into the South African legislation. However, these concepts are often used as grounds for rejection of asylum applications, despite the lack of legal basis. This practice may become policy in the context of the reform of the 2002 Immigration Act. 37 The 2011 Immigration Amendment Act introduced advance passenger processing, this is, the pre-clearance of persons prior to their arrival in South Africa, 38 which seems to be construed by the Government as a tool to apply the so-called "first safe country" concept, a notion that in absence of a legal definition could include both the "safe third country" as well as the "country of first asylum".
When questioned about the pre-screening procedure by the media, the South African Somalis were denied entry into South Africa because they didn't have the required documents (asylum permits) which they were supposed to acquire from the first country of safety before proceeding to South Africa. 
13
It would therefore appear that the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts hidden behind the newly introduced advance passenger processing would act as automatic tools to bar asylum applications by individuals who do not enter South Africa directly from the country of origin (effectively limiting access to asylum to applicants from neighbouring countries). And this appears to be done in absence of formal inter-State agreements whereby the receiving country either confirms that the individual already enjoys protection there or accepts responsibility to process the protection claim in accordance with international standards.
This development is especially worrying in the light of reports that refoulement of recognised refugees and asylum seekers whose applications are pending constitutes a worrying practice. 44 If such instances are known and documented in relation to individuals already "in the system", the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers intercepted and removed before they are able to lodge their claims in South Africa is of serious concern.
As it has been noted, a striking feature of this development is the absence of formal legal grounds to apply the first safe country concept. The background to such omission may be found in previous attempts to codify the practice. In 2000, the South African Department of Home
Affairs issued a Circular on the "first country of asylum" instructing all relevant authorities to verify the good faith of asylum seekers and refugees that reach South Africa having transited through numerous 'safe neighbouring countries' and further instructing them to refer them back 'from where they come from. If they insist on entering the Republic, they should be detained.' show that a worrying trend has been developing in the provision of protection by this country.
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The Spanish asylum system is governed by Article 13 (4) The "country of first asylum" and "safe third country" concepts, broadly defined, were introduced into Spanish asylum legislation in 1994 as grounds for inadmissibility, i.e., as a basis for denying access to a determination of the claim on the merits. The "safe third country" concept on which European regional agreements on the allocation of responsibility to examine asylum claims are based (currently the so-called Dublin III Regulation), was also a ground for inadmissibility. reference to their legal basis in the EU Procedures Directive-as grounds for inadmissibility.
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Therefore, applications which fall under these provisions shall not be considered on the merits.
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The actual impact of these concepts is not easy to evaluate. There are no statistics available that break down the reasons for rejection of asylum claims, so it is not possible to know how many applications are rejected on "safe third country" or "country of first asylum" grounds.
However, although these concepts were widely used when they were first introduced in the midnineties, observers note that they have now fallen out of use. An examination of the case law confirms the lack of practical relevance of these concepts. Research examining judicial appeals against asylum refusals showed that all cases examined except one were rejected on credibility grounds. 62 Anecdotal evidence does not add much to this picture; in one judgment of the Spanish
Supreme Court in 2004 on appeal, the Court noted that the applicant spent nine days in Italy and one day in France, where he could have applied for asylum -however the appeal was rejected also on credibility grounds and not by application of the "safe third country" concept inherent to the Dublin Regulation.
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The lack of current relevance of the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts in admissibility procedures examining claims lodged in Spanish territory or at its borders needs to be read in the light of developments on border and migration control. The . At the time of writing, the 2009 Act is still waiting for the adopting of its implementing regulations, where the actual features and procedure for the effective application of these concepts will be developed, in particular giving content to the mandate in article 27(2) of the Procedures Directive for national legislation to establish rules requiring a connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country concerned, as well as rules allowing an individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant. Please, note that in the Spanish legal system (as it is common in civil law countries), the lack of implementing regulations does not prevent the implementation of the Act itself, which is interpreted in accordance with other relevant legislation, notably the Constitution, relevant international treaties to which Spain is Party (and which according to Article 96(1) of the Spanish Constitution form part of the Spanish legal order), and general principles of law (which according to Article 1(4) of the Spanish Civil Code apply in absence of law and custom). As it has been said above, with the exception of 2013, Spain has seen a sharp decrease in asylum applications in recent years, 65 showing a correlation between increased border control operations and a decline in asylum applications that seems to speak to the success of the border control policies and the increased interception at sea operations -now largely coordinated by 
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It would appear that the developing Spanish policy just examined to externalise border controls outside its own territory and which results in refugees and others in need of protection being deprived from the right to seek asylum is coupled with a sense of impunity for the human rights violations that may take place outside Spanish territory, but still within its effective power
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or control, within the framework of those border and migration control operations. Indeed, the Spanish government seems to have developed a line of argument whereby it considers that its increased action outside its territory, in international waters and in the territory of other States, cannot be considered an exercise of jurisdiction and that accordingly no human rights can be engaged by its external action. This position has been accepted so far by the Supreme Court.
Despite the well established body of international decisions on the extra-territorial application of human rights instruments (most recently the Hirsi case 74 ), the Spanish Supreme Court found that the lack of powers to act (in the high seas and on foreign territory) forcibly leads to the conclusion that no human rights violations can be derived thereon, including violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution, such as the right to asylum and the right to an effective remedy. 75 At the time of writing, the lawfulness of this interpretation is pending before the Spanish Constitutional Court under the special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights.
In short, it would appear that the application of the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts has moved away from the procedural framework of asylum determination into a policy of interception and removals pursuant to readmission agreements to countries considered safe (but without protection safeguards) before individuals have had the chance to lodge an asylum claim. This policy offers asylum seekers no guarantee of having access to a determination procedure, either in Spain or in the "safe third country" or "country of first asylum" where they may be removed and runs the risk of resulting in refoulement. It is not surprising that the impact of this trend on the protection of asylum seekers and refugees has 
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The rapidly increasing arrival of foreign population to the US prompted a response in the mid 1990s to increase efforts to identify, detain, and deport unlawfully present immigrants, as well as lawfully present immigrants with criminal convictions in an attempt to control migration.
The use of mandatory detention and the grounds for mandatory deportation were expanded dramatically. Likewise, legislative amendments resulted in the introduction of the "country of first asylum" and "safe third country" concepts. 76 In its observations, the Committee took note of the bilateral agreements on the assisted return of minors that Spain has signed with Morocco and Senegal and expressed its concerns 'about the absence of safeguards ensuring the identification of children who may need international protection and may therefore be entitled to use the asylum procedure' and called on Spain to ensure 'protection against the repatriation of enacted an asylum regime in the US. 83 The Act establishes that protection may be granted to those who meet the criteria in Sec. Accessing protection on the Act's grounds may however be effectively constrained by the application of the "safe third country" and "country of first asylum" concepts, which the law embraces, although it attaches different legal consequences to each concept. The former prevents access to the asylum procedure and may constitute grounds for termination of asylum, while the latter is to be determined within an asylum procedure and may result in the denial of the asylum claim.
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Sec. 208(a)(2)(A) excludes asylum applications from individuals to whom the "safe third country" concept applies, except when the Attorney General finds that it is in the public interest for the alien to receive asylum in the United States:
Paragraph (1) 2)). Accordingly, it may be terminated under Sec.
208(c)(2)(C):
84 'the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a country […] in which the alien's life or freedom would not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and where the alien is eligible to receive asylum or equivalent temporary protection' (emphasis added).
The only "safe third country" agreement that the US has is with Canada. 85 The agreement is only applicable to refugee status determination claims lodged at a land border port of entry in one of them and aims at establishing responsibility in one of the parties to examine the claim. The "safe third country" concept has limited application as it currently only applies to Canada and only in relation to land entries. An issue of concern, however, arises from the lack of judicial review of its application, as Sec. 208(a)(3) establishes that 'no court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General' regarding decisions applying the "safe third country" concept.
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Therefore, individuals arriving into the US from Canada may find that they will not be given access to a determination procedure and instead be removed back to Canada without a right to appeal the decisions. As UNHCR already noted in relation to the draft Agreement, statutory bars in both jurisdictions (which are not identical) may mean that applicants may be required under the Agreement to make a claim in a jurisdiction where they would be ineligible for refugee protection, and therefore be denied rights under the Refugee Convention and its
Protocol that otherwise would be available to them.
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Serious concerns arise in relation to the impact of the Agreement on the other State Party:
Canada. The Canadian Council for Refugees notes that in practice few asylum seekers move from Canada to the US to make a refugee claim and that the Agreement is about preventing individuals who are in the US, or travelling through the US, from making a protection application in Canada. According to this organisation, under the Agreement, most applicants arriving in Canada at the US border are ineligible to make a claim in Canada, and are therefore removed to the US, where some of them are not able to receive protection due to existing law and policy (including statutory bars, such as the one-year deadline to lodge an application). The steady decrease in asylum applications in Canada is partly explained by the impact of the "safe third country" Agreement.
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At the time of its twelve month report on the implementation of the agreement, UNHCR expressed concern that while the vast majority of applicants affected by the so-called direct back policy (that removes automatically any asylum seeker arriving at a land border from one of the Parties to another until the time of their scheduled interview) did gain access to the Canadian refugee protection system, the Agency was nevertheless aware of six cases in which applicants were directed back to the U.S., detained and removed without having had an opportunity to pursue a refugee claim in Canada. Other primary areas of concern for UNHCR included the adequacy of existing reconsideration procedures, delayed adjudication of eligibility under the Agreement in the US, inadequacy of detention conditions in the US, and generally, lack of resources, communication, and training.
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Judicial challenges to reverse the Canadian designation of the US as a "safe third country" failed when the Canadian Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in 2009. 90 However, developments at the Inter-American Human Rights System suggest that some elements of the Agreement fall short of international human rights standards (this will be considered in the following section).
As far as the "country of first asylum" is concerned, Sec. Immigration and Naturalization Service must take into account to determine whether a refugee seeks asylum in this country as a consequence of his flight to avoid persecution.
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The determinant factor in the application of the principle is therefore not the mere presence, transit or temporary stay in a country prior to the applicant's arrival in the US; it is not even determined by the lapse of time, but rather by whether that stay in another country The meaning and scope of this provision has been built over time to ensure that asylum is not granted to those who have already found protection, while acknowledging that flight often takes place in different stages. 94 What is relevant is the understanding that mere transit through a country does not make it automatically a country of first asylum. 95 Immigration regulations have incorporated relevant case law, and define "firm resettlement" as follows: 96 An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement unless he or she establishes:
(a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish significant ties in that country; or (b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that country were so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled. In making his or her determination, the asylum officer or immigration judge shall consider the conditions under which other residents of the country live; the type of housing, whether permanent or temporary, made available to the refugee; the types and extent of employment available to the refugee; and the extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel documentation that includes a right of entry or re-entry, education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to others resident in the country.
In sum, while the application of the "safe third country" concept in the US seems to be of limited scope (as it only applies to Canada), practice under the Canada-US agreement shows that concern arise as a result of the difference in legislation in both countries (and in particular, in relation to statutory bars), as well as the lack of jurisdiction by courts to examine the application of the "safe third country" concept. The next section will consider the lawfulness of inter-State 96 8 C.F.R. §1208.15. agreements based on the "safe third country" concept from a perspective of international human rights and refugee law.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights following peer review. The version of record
M-T Gil-Bazo, 'The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection: Assessing State Practice' (2015) 33(1)
A COLLECTIVE MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION?
The previous section has shown the way in which States have developed legislation aiming at rejecting asylum applications on the grounds that another country is "safe". It has also shown the variety of ways in which States have articulated these concepts in policies vis-à-vis other States with which they have entered into formal and informal agreements allowing them to return asylum-seekers to other States.
What emerges clearly from the picture just presented is a trend whereby States seem to be making less use of the legislative concept of the "safe country" concept in determination procedures (which are subject to judicial scrutiny) in favour of operational arrangements (that is, formal or informal, regular or ad hoc cooperation/readmission agreements) in absence of guarantees that refugees will be treated in accordance with international standards, including the right to be granted asylum enshrined in international human rights instruments in all three regions considered.
In this context it is worth examining the two existing inter-State agreements for the processing of asylum claims based on the "safe third country" concept, namely the intra-EU mechanism enshrined in the Dublin III Regulation and the Canada-US agreement, and in particular, their ability to provide a model for international cooperation which effectively delivers on the international obligation towards refugees of its State Parties. 
THE DUBLIN SYSTEM
97 To be clear, these agreements are not examined here insofar as they apply to two of the countries examined in this paper (Spain and the US), but rather for the purposes of exploring whether existing State practice within inter-State agreements may constitute a model for the articulation of international cooperation based on the "safe third country" concept which may address the concerns posed by the current practice of States, as they emerge from the analysis of the three countries considered in the previous section of this paper.
The fundamental feature of the Dublin system is that it recognises explicitly an obligation of all Member States to examine an asylum application lodged in EU territory, 105 an obligation that will be discharged by one of them only on behalf of the rest:
Member States shall examine any application for international protection by a thirdcountry national or a stateless person who applies on the territory of any one of them, at another between Member States and refugees. 107 Evidence of such duality of obligations is the fact that despite inter-State agreements about the processing of their asylum claims, asylumseekers themselves may challenge the concrete applicability of the Dublin system to their circumstances before national courts and before the ECtHR, and indeed the latter has pronounced itself on it on several occasions. 108 Furthermore, the Member State that needs to undertake the determination of a claim which was not its own responsibility under Dublin would then be able 123 The sharp contrast between the principle that Member States wish to see legally enshrined in their cooperation agreement and the effective use that they make of it begs the question as to the purpose of maintaining a system which is costly both in Member States' resources as well as in time delays and uncertainty for asylum seekers.
THE CANADA-US AGREEMENT
The Canada-US Agreement is the other existing inter-State agreement aimed at the determination of a State responsible to process asylum applications. As it has been noted above, the Canada-US Agreement imposes a duty on each party not to remove applicants transferred under the terms of the agreement to any other country until an adjudication of the person's refugee status claim has been made, and in any case, unlike in the case of the Dublin system, it precludes the application of the "safe third country" concept to asylum-seekers transferred under the Agreement in relation to third States (Article 3).
As it has been noted above, judicial challenges to reverse the Canadian designation of the US as a "safe third country" failed when the Canadian Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in
2009
. 124 However, in March 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) decided on a case against Canada which also applies the "safe third country" concept embodied in Canada-US Agreement.
In the John Doe et al case, 125 the IACHR found that Canada was in violation of articles XXVII (on the right to asylum) and XVIII (on the right to a fair trial) of the American Declaration on Human Rights, as a result of Canada's application of its "direct-back policy" to three individuals who, having arrived into Canada from the US, were removed back to the US.
Under the "direct-back policy", asylum-seekers arriving into Canada through a land border with the US are removed back to the US if Canada cannot process their claims at that time and without any immediate consideration of their merits. Asylum-seekers are required to remain temporarily outside Canada until the dates for their asylum interviews. The IACHR found that Canada had denied the three claimants the right to seek asylum, exposed them to indirect refoulement, and deprived them from due process. 126 The IACHR determined that the question before it was to examine whether the right to asylum enshrined in Article XXVII of the 
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The significance of the IACHR decision is that it rejects the lawfulness of an inter-State system based on the automatic application of the "safe third country" concept. If the US and Canada are to comply with their international obligations under the American Declaration, the Canda-US Agreement must be amended to guarantee that no removals between the countries take place before an assessment of the safety of the other State Party, in particular in relation to the right to seek and receive asylum, the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.
Likewise, any decisions made under the Agreement must be judiciable if the right to an effective remedy is to be guaranteed. If State Parties are to comply with their international human rights obligations, including the right to asylum and the right to an effective remedy, it is essential that the system enshrine a robust right of judicial appeal (as it is envisaged in Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation) and that no removal take place while the judicial body is considering the merits of the claim. 134 A further essential element of any such agreement needs to ensure that if the system aims at allocating the responsibility to determine asylum claims to one State only, the decision of that State must be recognised by all other State Parties to the mechanism. As it has been noted above, the Dublin system is based on the mutual recognition of rejection decisions, which is not mirrored by the mutual recognition of recognition decisions. 135 The same applies to the Canada-US Agreement. This constitutes a fundamental flaw in the system which is contrary to the purpose of the Refugee Convention. The "safe third country" concept is used as grounds for the inadmissibility of the claim in Spain and in the US, departing from the standards in EXCOM conclusions. In Spain the same is true in relation to the country of first asylum, while in the US, this concept only constitutes one of the elements to be considered in the assessment of the claim on the merits.
ELEMENTS OF
The application of the concepts within the asylum determination procedure (whether at the admissibility stage or in an examination on the merits) seems to have declined over the years in favour of inter-State agreements on the determination of the State responsible to process an asylum claim (Spain and the US) as well as in readmission agreements -formal or informal, regular or ad hoc-in the context of migration control policies (Spain and South Africa). The practice of informal agreements raises particular issues in so far it denies access to an asylum procedure in any of the countries involved and may result in refoulement.
Furthermore, the ability of these concepts to produce the desired effect is questionable.
The US is the country that receives the second largest number of asylum applications in the world, while South Africa ranks third. Although in Spain there has been a sharp decline in asylum applications in recent years (notwithstanding the significant increase in 2013), the success of the Spanish policy seems to be based on the abandonment of the "safe third country" Given the very low transfer rates and the right to long term residence and freedom of movement that EU Law grants to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (after a number of years of regular lawful residence), the Dublin system should by nature become
redundant. Yet, Member States feel very strongly about maintaining the system in its current form.
If States choose to enter into international cooperation agreements on refugee determination, they need to ensure that the international obligations of each one of them under international refugee and human rights law discharged effectively by one of them and that when a positive refugee determination decision is made, such decision is mutually recognised by the rest. At a minimum, any such system must guarantee that any asylum claim will be examined in 
